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CURRENT DECISIONS
Adrnmistrative Law-TAxPAYER'S INTERVENTION IN THIRD-PARTY
Donaldson v. Unted States, 91 S. Ct. 534 (1971)

SUMMONS PROCEEDING.

The petitioner's income tax returns for the years 1964-67 were under
investigation by the Internal Revenue Service. The Service, proceeding
under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code,' issued a summons to
the petitioner's former employer 2 compelling disclosure of all records
pertinent to the pettioner's employment in an effort to ascertain the correct income tax liability of the petitioner. Claiming that the summons
had been issued in bad faith, the petitioner sought to intervene in order
to raise his objection in the district court proceeding to enforce the summons.
After issuing a temporary order restraimng the employer's compliance with the summons, the district court rejected the petitioner's contention that the summons had been issued in aid of a criminal mvestigation, and denied the motion to intervene.' The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.4 The Supreme Court held the petitioner's interest insufficient to compel the granting of his motion to intervene, and
affirmed the court of appeals. 5
The Internal Revenue Code imposes upon the Secretary of the Treasury the duty to canvass and inquire relative to the income tax liability
of any person.' In performing this duty, the Secretary is authorized "to
or any person having possession" 7
summon the person liable for tax
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7602, which provides:

For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return
tary or his delegate is authorized-

the Secre-

(2) To summon the person liable for tax
or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating
to the business of the person liable for tax

2. The employer, Acme Circus Operating Company, Inc., and its accountant, Joseph
J. Mercurio, were summoned. They did not object to the summons and were not parties
to the appeal. Donaldson v. United States, 91 S. Ct. 534, 538 n. 5 (1971).

3. The decision was made on order without opinion, and is unreported.
4. United States v. Mercurio, 418 F.2d 1213 (5th Cit. 1969)
5. Donaldson v. Umted States, 91 S. Ct. 534, 539 (1971).
6. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7601.
7. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7602 (2).
[226]
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of material relevant to the inquiry The constitutionality of the thirdparty summons has been upheld against fourth amendment challenge."
Protection for any person whose tax liability is under scrutiny by way
of third-party summons is afforded by sections 7402(b) 9 and 7604(a)"o
of the Internal Revenue Code, which grant to the district courts jurisdiction to compel compliance with the summons. Under these sections,
a summons enforcement action is "an adversary proceeding affording a
judicial determination of the challenges to the summons and giving complete protection to the witnesses." "I
The procedural device available to the taxpayer in asserting his objection to the third-party summons is intervention in the enforcement
proceeding 12 Intervention of right is available to one who has an interest relating to the subject matter of the action when the action may
impede his ability to protect that interest and when the interest is not
adequately represented by the parties at bar.'" In Reuman vu. Caplin, 4 the
Court acknowledged the applicability of intervention procedure to enforcement proceedings pursuant to a section 7602 summons."
Several lower courts read the Reisman acknowledgement as an approval of unrestricted intervention by the taxpayer.' 6 Illustrative of this
viewpoint is the observation of the Seventh Circuit that "had the Court
intended simply to hold that the particular interests of the taxpayers in8. First National Bank of Mobile v. United States, 267 U.S. 576 (1925).
9. INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7402 (b).
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to
testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the
United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found
shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance,
testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.
10. Id. § 7604(a).
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to
testify, or to produce books, papers, records or other data, the United States
district court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall
have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data.
11. Reisman v. Caplan, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1964).
12. Fmn. R. Civ. P 24.
13. FED. R. Civ. P 24(a).
14. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
15. Id. at 445.
16. United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bank of
Commerce, 405 F.2d 931 (3rd Cir. 1969); Justice v. United States, 365 F.2d 312 (6th Cir.
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volved in those cases were sufficient bases for intervention, the opinion
would doubtless have made that evident." "
The Donaldson fact situation forced the Court to modify the broad
sweep of its language in Reisman.' Donaldson concludes that the intervention contemplated by Reisman is permissive only, and that Reisman
cannot be read as sanctioning mandatory intervention in all cases. 9 The
Court further rejects any inference that a mere interest in potential tax
liability can support a claim for intervention of right, since the only interest which would allow intervention of right is a "significantly protectable" interest. 20 Under this definition, an interest in potential tax
liability is insufficient since evidence related to that liability would not
be subject to suppression if obtained by other routine means.
To complete its qualification of Reisman, the Donaldson Court crystallizes the point at which intervention becomes available to a taxpayer
who claims an interest in the summons proceeding founded in potential
criminal liability Citing with approval cases which have allowed the
use of the section 7602 summons in investigations likely to lead to crimnal as well as civil liability,2 1 the Court rejects the contention that the
introduction of special agents establishes a right to intervene. 22 Rather,
it is when the sole purpose of the inquiry is to obtain evidence for use
in a criminal prosecution that the taxpayer must be allowed to intervene
in a summons proceeding. In the Court's view, the investigation attains
this purpose only after a recommendation for prosecution has been made,
and subsequent to that recommendation the section 7602 summons may
not be issued.2
In resolving a conflict among the circuits, the Donaldson Court has
offered to the Internal Revenue Service a wide berth for the exercise of
the investigatory function. The decision may well be subject to abuse,
for by withholding recommendations for prosecution in cases like
Donaldson, the Service places upon the taxpayer the burden of proving
bad faith before intervention will be allowed. Given the competing interests of the Service in ascertaining a civil tax liability and the taxpayer
17. United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1969). Under this interpretaton, Reisman became a sub silentio approval of broad and unrestricted rights of
intervention.
18. 91 S. Ct. at 541-42.
19. Id. at 542.
20. Id.
21. See cases cited m 91 S. Ct. at 543 n.13.
22. 91 S.Cr. at 545.
23. Id.
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as a potential criminal defendant, the Court has come out in favor of the
government. The decision places a large measure of trust in the Service's ability to conduct investigations in an even-handed manner. Should
that trust prove ill-placed in practice, the Court will be forced to reverse
itself again.
ROBERT C. Kocm
Antitrust Law-STATE-REGULATED INDUSTRIES. Washington Gas
Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971)
Plaintiff and defendant are competing public utilities. As part of a
promotional campaign, defendant agreed to allow credit against underground wiring installation fees, based on anticipated power consumpnon, with the result that all-electric homes would be served with underground distribution free of installation charges.' Plaintiff initiated suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
claiming that defendant's practice constituted an illegal tie-in sale under
section one of the Sherman Act. 2 From a decision for the plaintiff, defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on two
grounds: 1) that defendant's promotional activities as permitted by the
State Corporation Commission amounted to state action exempt from
federal antitrust regulation, 3 and 2) that in any event the practice did
4
not constitute a tie-m sale.
The immunity of state action from antitrust control stems from the
Supreme Court's observation in Parker v. Brown5 that "[t] he Sherman
Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it
was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a
state." 6 It was primarily on the authority of Parker that the court of
appeals here found VEPCO's activities to be exempt from antitrust
control.7 However, the two cases arose from substantially diverse fact
1. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 250
(4th
2.
3.
4.

Cir. 1971).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
438 F.2d at 252.
Id. at 254.

5. 317 U.S. 341 (1942).
6. Id. at 351.
7.
We think VEPCO's promotional practices were at all tnies within the
ambit of regulation and under the control of SCC, arid we hold these

